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Abstract
We present a protocol for verification of “no such entry” replies from
databases. We introduce a new cryptographic primitive as the underlying
structure, the keyed hash tree, which is an extension of Merkle’s hash
tree. We compare our scheme to Buldas et al.’s Undeniable Attesters and
Micali et al.’s Zero Knowledge Sets.
In the following, the term database refers to a system supplying the simplest
form of databases, a table of (key, value) pairs with functions for keyed insertion
and retrieval.
1 Motivation: Untrusted Databases
There are situations where the users of a database system cannot trust the
database. For example, the database might be outside the users’ security
perimeter, or might not follow the same security policies as the users. The users
must therefore assume that the database could be taken over by an attacker.
The entities writing the database entries want to be sure that the database
delivers their entries on requests unchanged. The database maintainer wants to
be able to defend itself against accusations of misbehavior.
2 Threat scenario
How can an attacker or malicious database maintainer deceptively influence the
database’s replies? The following list explains the attacks:
1. Changing existing entries: The attacker can change the value of an
existing entry.
2. Creating false entries: The attacker can create (key, value) pairs him-
self.
3. Re–labeling existing entries: The attacker can insert existing values
under different keys.
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4. Returning old entries: If the value of a (key, value1) pair is overwritten
by a new value2, the attacker can return the old value1 on request for key.
5. Denying existing entries: On a search request, the attacker can make
the database deny that a value exists for the given key in the table.
This is not only of theoretical interest. Real–life examples are web–hosting
solutions, where the changing parts of all web pages are kept in a central rela-
tional database and the pages are constructed from templates. Another exam-
ple is the Internet’s Domain Name System (DNS), which is basically a partially
distributed lookup–table. Attacks on DNS as listed above are described in
(1), remedies are suggested in the DNS Security Extensions(2) and a draft by
Bellovin (3).
2.1 Detecting Attacks
The readers should be able to detect if the database is lying about entries. The
database should be able to prove the correctness of its answers as long as the
writers are honest. For most of the listed attacks, this can easily be achieved if
public key cryptography is employed. It is not necessary to assume the existence
of a global Public Key Infrastructure for this purpose. It is sufficient if the read-
ers of the database have access to all the public keys of the writers (presumably
a smaller set than the readers). The keys must be stored outside the database.
With this information at hand, and routines for signature creation (Sk) and
verification (Vk), readers and writers can make attacks 1 – 3 detectable under
standard cryptographic assumptions. Here is how:
1. Changing existing entries: Writers sign the values of their entries and
include the signature in the value of the table. Readers check the signa-
tures and detect changes by the database.
(key, value) = (key, data||Sk(data))
2. Creating false entries: The same applies here. Since the database has
no access to the writer’s secret keys, it cannot produce deceptive entries.
3. Re–labeling existing entries: This calls for an extension: the writers
now include the key in the data they sign:
(key, value) = (key, data||Sk(key||data))
The readers can now check if the entry belonged to the key they gave in
their search request.
Points 4 and 5, however, pose a harder problem. If there is no information
about existing entries anywhere outside the database, then these attacks cannot
be detected.
As for point 4, from the algebraic properties of standard digital signatures it
follows that a signature on an old entry will still be valid after the entry has been
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replaced. There are signature schemes where the signer’s cooperation is neces-
sary for verification, called undeniable signatures. The concept was presented
first by Chaum (4) in 1989. Such a scheme in our scenario would introduce
much more communication than in the standard writer–database–reader setup.
A writer who substitutes an existing entry would have to reliably notify the
writer of the previous version, so that the previous author retracts the signa-
ture (e.g. by sending a new “signature outdated” message in the verification
protocol). Readers would need to communicate with writers who might not be
available every time someone wants to validate a reply. We would like to avoid
such a complicated and error–prone setup.
The problem with point 5 is that from the perspective of the database, it
would mean proving that it does not know the table entry, an impossible feat
in this scenario. Since there is no value returned, there can be no signature,
unless the writers supply a special “no entry” value tied to every possible and
unused key.
There are ways around this, however, if we allow the writers and readers
access to another service besides the database. The service is required to supply
a single value on request; authenticated writers must be able to overwrite that
value. We will call this service the announcement service;
The writers store a signed, condensed description of the database’s state.
This value must be updated after every write to the database. The readers
can use this description to validate the database’s replies. We will call this
summary of database state a state credential. The validation protocol consists
of two parts:
• A writer builds and publishes a new state credential from the previous
one.
• Readers check the validity of a database reply. This requires interaction
with the announcement service and the database.
3 State Credentials for Databases
Our requirements for the state credential (to be short and uniquely bound to
the database state) suggest the application of a cryptographic hash function.
We will now describe several possibilities to build state credentials with hash
functions.
3.1 Simple Hash
This is the simplest form of a state credential. The writer queries the database
for all entries and inserts the key of his/her new entry. The writer then sorts all
keys in a pre–defined order and computes the hash value over all of them. This
value is signed and supplied through the announcement service. Formally:
c = h(
n∑
i=0
ki)
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where n is the number of entries in the database, ki is the ith key in the particular
order and addition denotes string concatenation after adding a special “end of
key” marker to the parameters. The simple hash is not a solution, because to
check a database reply against this, a reader would have to download the whole
database as well.
3.2 Hash Chain
Application of hash chains make the computation of the credential cheaper. The
writer pulls the latest credential from the announcement service and “adds” the
new entry’s key. Formally:
c0 = h()
ci = h(ci−1 + ki)
where ci is the credential after adding the ith entry to the database and h() is
the hash of the empty string. Addition is defined as above.
To validate a database reply, a reader would have to pull all keys up to the
requested key in their order of addition. In the interesting case of a non–existing
key, the reader has to pull the whole database. So this is still not satisfactory.
3.3 Hash Trees
Merkle’s (5) hash trees allow fast (Log-Time) verification of digests over many
entries. Hashes over pairs of entries (the keys in our scenario) are computed
and the resulting hashes are again paired and new hashes computed and so on.
The number of entries has to be a power of 2. Formally:
H(l, j) = h(kj)
H(i, j) = h(H(i+ 1, ⌈
(i+ j − 1)
2
⌉).H(i+ 1, ⌈
i+ j + 1
2
⌉))
where l = log2(#entries), by “.” we denote the concatenation of strings and kj
is the jth key in an arbitrary order (H(1, 1) is the root of the tree).
The state credential at the announcement service must be updated for each
new entry and a hash tree root can only be computed if the number of entries
is a power of two. So we must find a form of state credential that allows instant
updating but still can use hash trees.
The solution is to split the number of entries into powers of 2 and to generate
hash trees of appropriate height for all of those powers. For this reason, the state
credential will consist of a number of hash tree roots, at most log2(n− 1) where
n is the number of entries, together with the height of the trees. When an entry
is added to the non–empty database, and if the number of entries is odd after
the addition, then a new hash tree of height zero (simply the hash of the key)
is appended to the state credential. If the number is even, then the two most
recent tree roots are combined (hashed together) to form the root of a higher
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tree. This is done recursively from the end. Note that we must start at the
zeroth entry, since even an empty database needs a state credential.
So if the bit representation is
n− 1 =
⌊log
2
(n−1)⌋∑
i=0
bi · 2
i
and t =
∑
bi (the Hamming–weight of n − 1), then the credential consists of
the roots of t hash trees of height i for every bi = 1.
The database in turn keeps a counter of entries. It can thus deduce in which
of the trees in the current state credential an entry resides. This is achieved by
comparing the entry’s number against the current set of trees and their heights.
If a reader wishes to validate the databases’ reply for a certain key k, the
database has to supply a path in the tree leading to the leaf with k, as well
as all pairs of hashes along that path. The reader can now verify that each
pair’s concatenation hashes to the corresponding hash in the next pair, up to
the root of the tree in the state credential. Communication with the database
for validation is bounded at worst by log2(n) · 2 · |h()| bytes, where |h()| is the
byte–length of the hash’s output.
The drawback of this scheme is that validation of a negative reply (“no such
entry”) still requires downloading the whole database.
4 Keyed Hash Trees
Our contribution is the introduction of keyed hash trees. In these, the position
of a leaf in the tree is dependent on the key corresponding to the leaf. Our
construction uses a tree of height |h()|, where h is a cryptographic hash function.
For every (key, value) in the database, a leaf is inserted in the tree, where the
path to the leaf from the root is defined by h(key) and the data in the leaf is
h(value). Leaves without a corresponding entry are implicitly set to the hash
of the empty string h().
We call a sub–tree empty if there is no path leading through the sub–tree’s
root that leads to a leaf with a non–empty value. All leaves of an empty sub–
tree have the value h(). The nodes in the layer above the leaves all have value
h(h(), h()), and so on. Note that all nodes in a layer have the same value,
which in turn is derived from the hash of the empty word. It is easy to pre–
compute these values. It allows identification of a sub–tree as being empty by
a single table lookup, since all empty sub–trees of equal height have the same
pre–computed root hash.
From the collision resistance for cryptographic hash functions, it follows that
∀a, b : a 6= b : h(a.b) 6= h(b.a).
The value of the tree’s root thus depends on all the leaves’ values and all the
paths. In contrast to the schemes above, non–existing entries do have leaves
and paths and can thus be validated.
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Storing and working on a binary tree of height 160 (for h = SHA1 for
example) seems daunting at first, since there would be 2160+1 − 1 entries, only
a few orders of magnitude less then the number of hydrogen atoms in the whole
universe. But all except n of the leaves are empty, where n is the number of
entries in the database. We will show in Section 5 that it is sufficient to store
only the non–empty leaves and the branches leading to them from the root.
Before inserting a new entry (key, value) in the database, a writer requests
all pairs of hashes on the path to the new entry. The writer then validates the
hashes against the current state credential, which is the root of the keyed hash
tree. The writer substitutes the hash in the respective leaf by the hash of the
value, and computes a new root hash. He then signs this root hash and puts it
on the announcement service after inserting the new entry in the database.
To validate a database reply, the reader requests all pairs of hashes on the
path derived from the key. For positive replies, the reader hashes over the
returned value, compares that with the hash in the corresponding leaf and pro-
ceeds as with a standard hash tree.
If the reply was negative (“no such entry”), then the path must lead to an
empty leaf and — as in the hash tree scheme above — the hash values can be
checked recursively up to the root. The root must be the same as the signed
value received from the announcement service.
5 Sparse Hash Tree Algorithms
Our database should be able to respond quickly to requests for pairs of hashes
along a given path. To do this, we need an internal representation of the keyed
hash tree corresponding to the current database table.
We are helped by the keyed hash tree’s property that all empty sub–trees of
equal height are identical (an algorithm for creating a list of all empty sub–trees’
roots is given in figure 1).
Instead of storing 2161− 1 nodes, we need to store only those nodes that are
part of a path to an existing entry in the database, i.e. the hash of at least one
key in the database describes a path leading through the node. To reduce the
space further, we store only one node for every sub–tree that contains exactly
one entry, i.e. the first node from the root down which lies on one single path is
used to describe the whole sub–tree containing the corresponding leaf. We call
the resulting data structure a sparse hash tree.
The main problem is that searching in the tree is done from the root down
to the leaf, while the hash values in the nodes are computed from the leaves up.
Each stored node in our hash tree representation is a struct defined in
listing 2
The b[2] array contains pointers to the left and right children, or NULL
if there is no respective child. flag indicates whether this node represents a
BRANCH or a LEAF. hash is the hash of the tree rooted in this node. Only in leaf
nodes is e not NULL and contains a pointer to a struct entry defined in listing
2. Note that leaf nodes do represent the leaves of the tree, but only non–empty
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Listing 1: Pre–Computation of all empty sub–trees
list empty_init (void){
i = 0;
Empty[i] = h();
for (;i <159;i++) {
Empty[i] = h(Empty[i -1] . Empty[i-1]);
}
return Empty;
}
Listing 2: Structures node and entry
struct node {
struct node *b[2];
#define LEAF 1
#define BRANCH 2
int flag;
struct entry *e;
unsigned char* hash;
};
struct entry {
unsigned char* path;
unsigned char* value;
};
leaves have leaf nodes. The nodes contain data structures that allow dynamic
computation of all node–values of the hash tree below their path.
entry holds the information necessary to compute all nodes below the node
pointing to it (see algorithm leafnode for details). path is a bit–string of 0s
and 1s and describes the path to the actual leaf from the leaf node, i.e. the
part of the path for which we don’t store nodes, but generate them as needed.
value contains the hash of the entry at the actual leaf.
5.1 Computing Pairs along a Path
The function rootpath defined in listing 3 on page 7 returns a list of pairs of
hashes along a given path. The first two If statements handle the special cases
that there is at most one entry in the sparse tree. rootpath calls the auxiliary
functions nullnode, leafnode and branchnode.
nullnode simply builds pairs of empty sub–tree roots in ascending order.
Listing 3: rootpath(): Generating all pairs of hashes along path
list rootpath(node root , bitstring path) {
if(root == NULL){
/* empty sub -tree */
return nullnode(path);
}
If(root ->flag == LEAF){
/* exactly one leaf in subtree */
return leafnode(root , path);
}
if(root ->flag == BRANCH){
/* non -unique path */
init ( List);
return branchnode (path , root , List);
}
}
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Listing 4: nullnode()
list nullnode(bitstring path){
init ( List);
for(i=0; i < length(path); i++){
push List , ( Empty[i], Empty[i]);
}
return(List);
}
Listing 5: singlepath(): Computing pairs of hashes in a sub–tree with exactly
one given (path, value)
list singlepath (bitstring path , char value[160]) {
revpath = reverse ( path);
init ( List);
init ( pair);
i=1;
bit = shift revpath;
pair[bit ] = value;
pair[not bit ] = Empty[0];
push (List , pair);
while(bit = shift revpath) {
pair[bit ] = h(List [0][0] . List[0][1]);
pair[not bit ] = Empty[i++];
push (List , pair);
}
return List;
}
leafnode calls singlepath to generate a temporary list of all non–empty
sub–trees below the leaf node. It then compares the supplied path against the
path to the leaf and selects the pairs from the temporary list for the maximum
left–match of the paths. For the rest of the path, empty sub–tree roots are
appended to the selected pairs. This list is returned.
branchnodewalks recursively down the tree as long as the path runs through
BRANCH nodes. At each step it appends the hashes in the children of the
current node to the list. At the point where the path changes to an undefined or
LEAF node, branchnode calls nullnode or leafnode respectively, to complete
the list.
5.2 Inserting an Entry
insert (algorithm 8 on page 18) recursively walks down the tree along the given
path, putting the traversed nodes on the stack. If the path runs into an empty
subtree, a LEAF node with the given (path, value) is created. If the path runs
through a LEAF node, the entry in the node is moved one step along its path
down the tree, the node is converted to a BRANCH, and insert is called again
on it. On the way up to the root, all the hashes on the path are adjusted.
5.3 Deleting an Entry
delete (algorithm 9 on page 19) recursively walks down the tree until it reaches
the LEAF node with the entry to delete. On the way up, it checks if the current
node has only one child, which is a LEAF. If so, the entry in the leaf is attached
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Listing 6: leafnode(): Generating pairs of hashes along a path below a leaf
node
list leafnode (struct node *node , bitstring path) {
init ( TmpList );
init ( List);
init ( pair);
i=0;
/* create list of non -empty nodes ’ hashes */
TmpList = singlepath (node ->e->path , node ->e->value);
/* compare given path against path of leaf */
while(path[i] == node ->e->path[i]) {
append (List , TempList[i]);
i++;
}
height = length(path) - i;
/* if the two diverge, return empty nodes ’ hashes */
while(height > 0) {
pair = ( Empty[height], Empty[ height]);
append (List , pair);
height --;
}
return List;
Listing 7: branchnode(): Generating pairs of hashes along a path below a
branch node
list branchnode (struct node *n, bitstring path) {
init ( pair);
/* get hashes of children */
for(b = 0 , 1){
if (n->b[b] != NULL){
pair[b] = n->b[b]-> hash;
} else {
pair[b] = Empty[ length(path)];
}
}
append (List , pair);
bit = shift path;
if (n->b[bit ] != NULL && n->b[bit]-> flag == BRANCH){
/* walk down */
append (List , branchnode (path , n->b[bit ], List));
} else {
if(n->n[bit ] != NULL && n->b[bit]-> flag == LEAF){
/* we hit a leaf */
append (List , leafnode(path , n->b[bit ]));
} else {
/* walked into an empty sub -tree */
append (List , nullnode(path));
}
}
return List;
}
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to the parent, and the child deleted. This is to handle situations where two leaves
hang at the end of a stalk. If one of the leaves is removed, the stalk would be a
series of roots of subtrees with exactly one entry. To keep storage minimal, this
should be avoided. delete attaches the lonely leaf at the uppermost branch of
the stalk.
5.4 Properties
We assume that the hash function h behaves as an ideal hash function would,
an assumption often used in cryptography called the Random Oracle Model. It
implies that the output of h is indistinguishable from the output of a random
function. Under this assumption, our algorithms have the following properties:
The sparse tree in memory is nearly balanced. If h’s output behaves as ran-
domness, the paths in the tree will be random walks starting at the root.
For a large number n of entries, 12i paths will lead through each node at
the ith layer in the tree, and the average path length is log2(n).
Space for the sparse tree is bounded by twice the number of entries in the
database. We store n entries at n leaves, and each pair of nodes has one
parent–node. This means that
maxnodes(n) =
⌈log
2
(n)⌉∑
i=0
2i
= 2⌈log2(n)⌉+1 − 1
< 2 · n
Pairs along paths to a non–existing key can be computed quickly. If the key is
not in the table, then the path will enter an empty subtree after log2(n)
steps, in the mean. For one million entries, for example, this means that
after traversal of 20 nodes on average, nullnode will be called, and all
that remains to be done is table lookups.
Readers recognize non–existing keys after log2(n) steps from the root, in the
mean. The pre–computation shown in 1 consists of 160 calls to the hash
function. After this, a reader simply checks the returned pairs from the
database against the pre–computed table Empty.
Maximum message size per validation is 2·|h()|·|h()| bits. Two pairs of |h()| bit
hashes per step lie on a path with |h()| steps. For SHA-1 as h, this would
mean 6400 bytes per validation. If stronger collision resistance is required,
a cryptographic hash function with longer output may be chosen. While
the resistance grows exponentially with the hash size, the messages grow
only linearly.
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The database can be distributed over several machines. The insert, delete
and rootpath functions are independent of the actual height of the stored
tree. As long as writers and readers know how to compute the 2d+1 − 1
hashes at the root of the tree, they can use d independent databases. This
would also allow d concurrent writes, by locking at the branches.
6 Related Work
There are other schemes with different objectives related to the one just pre-
sented. We will discuss the differences to our proposal.
6.1 Undeniable Attesters
Ahto Buldas et al. presented schemes for accountable certificate management
in 2000 ((6) and (7)). In their scenario, the database is a part of a certificate
authority (CA), i.e. the list of valid certificates. Their goal is to make sure that
there is never an ambiguity about the state of a certificate. On request for a key
k, the database sends an attester p = P (k, S), which is a cryptographic state-
ment about the presence or absence of the key k in the table S. The database
also returns a digest d = D(S) which is a summary of the database’s table
S. Any party can then call a verification algorithm V (k, d, p) which returns
“Accept” if the statement p about k was correct for table summary d or else
“Reject”. Buldas et al. call an attester undeniable if a CA can produce two con-
tradicting attesters for the same key with only negligible probability. Formally,
this is defined as follows:
Let EA be the class of probabilistic algorithms of polynomial runtime. Let
k be the security parameter (in our context the bitlength of the hash function’s
output). The attester A is given by the tuple of algorithms A = (G,P ,D,V)1.
Its resilience against an attacker A of class EA is defined as
UNA,‖(A) = Pr[(x, d, p, p¯)← A(1
k) : V (x, d, p) = Accept∧ V (x, d, p¯) = Reject] .
If k can be chosen as to minimize UNA,‖ below any given ǫ, then A is called
undeniable.
The paper examines different schemes for attesters and concludes with an
efficient, undeniable attester based on search trees.
6.1.1 Search Trees
A search tree (see for example Knuth (8)) is a binary tree with the additional
property that there is a comparison relation < and each node contains a value
v for which the following holds:
vl < v < vr,
1G serves only to select a hash function for a given security parameter k.
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where vl and vr are the values in the left and right child of the node, respectively.
If one or both children do not exist, the empty string is used instead. Buldas
et al. add another field to each node, which holds the hash hv = h(hvl .v.hvr ).
The digest d — the root of the search tree — is signed by the CA and published
through an untrusted Publication Authority (PA). The digest corresponds to
our state credential and the PA to our announcement service.
A proof p output by P for a key k is a list p = (V0, . . . , Vm) of values
Vi = (hL, ki, hR), where ki is the value of a node and hL, hR are the hashes
stored in the left andx. right child of the node, repectively, or the empty string
if there is no such node. The values are selected such that k0 = k if k is in the
database. If k is not in the database, then the tree contains two keys j and l
such that l is the smallest value larger than k and j the largest value smaller
than k. By construction of the tree, there is a path from the node of j to the
root leading through l or vice versa. The key of j and l which is lower in the
tree is used as k0 in that case. If k is larger or smaller than all keys in the search
tree, then l or j is set to the largest or smallest key in the tree, respectively.
p together with the published digest d allows to prove the absence of a key.
The verifier can check the hashes from k0 to the root and verify the strict order
of child nodes. If a key k is not in the tree, then p will contain j, l such that
j < k < l ∧ ¬∃ki ∈ p : j < ki < k ∨ k < ki < l. By the strict order and lack of
right children of j and left children of l, k cannot be a node’s value in the tree.
The verifier V (x, d, p) returns “Error” if any of the following fails:
• Checking the order of keys in p.
• Computing and comparing the hashes along the path given in p up to the
root.
• Comparing d against the root hash in p.
If x is the first key in p, V returns “Accept”, else “Reject”.
6.1.2 Differences to our Proposal
The attester states absence or presence in a list, exclusively. A state credential
includes the value of the entry under the key, so that changes of an entry can
be expressed.
Buldas et al. assume that the database is reigned by a single entity which is
trustworthy at the moment when an attester is issued, but may turn untrusted
or unavailable later. That the database signs the digest itself establishes a
different scenario than in our setting.
To show that the database cheated, a user has to find another attester con-
tradicting the attester he/she received. In our setting, a reader can prove that
the database cheated immediately and without contacting other readers.
6.1.3 Reduction of State Credentials to Attesters
We can build undeniable attesters for keys from signed state credentials. Since
values of entries are irrelevant for attesters, we will substitute the (key, value)
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pairs in our algorithms by (key, key) pairs. Since the empty word might be an
entry’s key in the generality of the proof, we will use the reserved key τ instead
in that case. The digest d is the state credential, but is supplied by the database
instead of the announcement service. Our (P,D, V ) are defined as follows:
P (x, S) is the list of pairs of hashes along the path given by h(x) in the keyed
hash tree generated from all entries in S.
D(S) is the root of said keyed hash tree.
V (x, d, p) outputs “Error” if any of the following fails:
• Comparing the hash at the leaf corresponding to x against h(x) or
h().
• Hashing the pairs of hashes up along the path h(x).
• Comparing the resulting root hash against d.
If the leaf value at the end of path h(x) is the empty hash, then V returns
“Reject”. If the leaf value is h(x), then “Accept”.
6.1.4 Proof of Undeniability
Assume that some A ∈ EA outputs (x, d, p, p¯) with probability ǫ, such that
V (x, d, p) = Accept and V (x, d, p¯) = Reject. Since V did not return “Error”, all
the pairs of hashes in p and in p¯ resolved up to d. This means that A produced a
collision in the hash h with probability ǫ, and the values x1, x2, y1, y2 : (x1.x2) 6=
(y1.y2) : h(x1.x2) = h(y1.y2) are members of p and p¯. Thus we have reduced
the security of our attester to the collision resistance of the hash h.
6.1.5 Considerations about the underlying Data Structures
Bulda’s et al. use the search keys as they are, because the proofs of non–
membership in the table rely on the greater–than relation between the keys.
This has the disadvantage that the tree becomes unbalanced if the inserted
entries are not uniformly distributed or if the first entry (the subsequent root)
is not near the median of the set of entries. Unbalanced search trees cause longer
searches, as more than log2(n) nodes need to be traversed for some keys. The
paper does not explain whether there is any re–balancing (see for example (8))
done on the search tree. Re–balancing this particular tree type would change
all the hash–entries on the path from the previous root to the new one. Our
sparse hash tree in memory is always balanced for large n.
Using the keys as they are makes the attester’s size unpredictable. With
state credentials, the size is fixed (and quite small).
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6.2 Zero-Knowledge Sets
Unknown to this author, S. Micali, M. Rabin and J. Kilian presented a more
general scheme, called Zero–Knowledge Sets (9) in 2003. Their goal was to
prove set–membership non–interactively and that without leaking any other
information about the set. The data structure underlying their scheme is almost
identical to the keyed hash trees defined above.
Micali et al. use a commitment scheme to bind the database to its previous
statements about its contents.
6.2.1 Pedersen’s Commitment Scheme
In commitment schemes, a prover P commits to a message m by making public
a commitment string c and computing a proof r. Before P publishes m or
r, nothing should be inducable about the message m from c. After P sends
message m, a verifier V can check whether this was the message committed to
by c. For this, P supplies V with r. A commitment scheme is secure if P can
produce contradicting proofs r, r′ only with neglegible probability.
Pedersen’s scheme requires four public parameters, i.e., two primes p, q such
that q|p − 1, and two generators g, h, where g and h generate G ⊂ F⋆p, the
subgroup of order q in F⋆p. P commits to m by publishing c = g
mhrmod p.
r is the corresponding proof, a randomly chosen value ≤ q. To verify the
commitment, V re–computes c for herself and compares.
To produce two proofs r, r′ for differing messagesm,m′, P would have to find
r, r′ such that gmhr = gm
′
hr
′
mod p. Assume she succeeded. She then could
compute gm−m
′
= hr
′−rmod p and from this (gm−m
′
)r
′−r = (hr
′−r)r−r
′
=
hmod p and thus get logg(h)mod p, breaking the discrete logarithm mod p. It
follows that the security of the Pedersen commitment is reducible to the discrete
log problem. It also follows that if logg(h) is known to the prover, she can fake
arbitary commitments.
Micali et al. use this scheme to construct a hash function H : {0, 1}⋆ →
{0, 1}k where k is the bitlength of prime p. They use this hash function to
process a data–structure very much like our keyed hash tree from section 4.
Their prover builds the tree by first inserting all leaves derived from the
database’s entries, such that the value in the leaf is H(D(x)), where D(x) is the
value stored in the database under key x, and the leaf’s position in the tree is
determined by the path described by H(x). The prover adds all nodes on those
paths to the root, their values remain undefined until later. She adds those
nodes whose parents are now in the tree, but does not repeat this recursively.
These nodes correspond to the empty subtree’s roots in our construction.
In the next step, the prover generates a random exponent ev for every node
v in the structure, and stores hv = h
ev in it if v is a non–empty leaf or the
ancestor of one, and hv = g
ev for the empty leaves. Thus the prover knows
logghv for these nodes, a property exploited later.
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The prover now computes commitments for the leaves by computing cv =
gmvhrvv , where mv = H(D(x)) or 0, hv the value stored in the last step, and rv
a random value chosen per leaf.
In the last step, the internal nodes of the tree get their commitment values
generated. The process runs from the leaves upwards as in Merkle’s scheme.
Each internal node u is associated a value mu = H(cu0, hu0, cu1, hu1), where
u0, u1 are the left and right children of node u. From this and the value hu
stored alread in u, cu is computed as g
muhru for a randomly chosen ru ∈ F
⋆
p.
The commitment value for the whole database is the commitment of the tree’s
root cD. This value is published before any queries are answered.
To prove that the value stored under key x is y in the database, the prover
provides the tuples (mv, ev, hv, rv) for every node on the path through the tree
given by H(x), together with the values cv0, hv0, cv1, hv1 for v’s siblings.
To check this proof, verifier V
1. compares the leaf’s mv against H(y).
2. checks recursively that mv = H(cv0, hv0, cv1, hv1)
3. checks for every v on the path that hv = h
ev and cv = g
mvhrvv .
For a proof of the non–existance of key x in the database, the prover provides
all the nodes’ values along the path given by H(x) as long as these nodes are
in the generated tree. The last of these nodes, u, will have mu = 0. If P would
supply this to V , then the verifier would learn that there are no non–empty
nodes in this sub–tree. To disguise this fact, P generates a branch of non–
empty nodes down to a virtual, empty leaf (the computation goes bottom–up
however). Node u becomes the branch’s root for this proof, the value mu = 0 is
substituted by the value in the uppermost node of the freshly generated branch.
The prover can do this convincingly because she can re–commit to any
(mu, ru) in node u. This is caused by the special construction of hu for empty
leaves, where P knows the value of logg(hu) by design. This allows to “glue”
the generated branch of nodes, complete with their commitments, to node u.
The verification runs as above, except that V checks for mH(x) = 0.
6.2.2 Differences to our proposal
In our proposal, the writers are different entities from the database, but they
compute the committment string. They are continuously updating and chang-
ing entries. In Micali et al.’s terminology, our writers commit to the history of
their changes to the database, while the database later proves that it did reply
in accordance to it state after the latest update. Zero–knowledge was no re-
quirement in our design. Since the motivations and requirements are different,
the mechanisms behind Micali et al.’s scheme and ours differ in several points:
Multiple, mutually trusting authors in our design, multiple database au-
thors (writers) were a prerequisit. It is not obvious, how zero knowledge
sets could be adapted for multiple writers. Two writers would have to
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communicate at least the secret ev, rv for each node to be able to insert
entries. This would require a secure authenticated channel between all
writers.
Zero knowledge the zero–knowledge requirement is violated in our scheme,
because a proof about any key will leak information about the existence
or non–existence of other keys.
Database modification one of our requirements was that the database can
be modified by the writers who can re–compute the credential/attester/-
commitment for the database. The zero-knowledge property of Micali et
al.’s scheme is lost if the database is allowed to change/add/remove en-
tries. This is because the commitment values change along the path to a
modified node and thus give away information about the minimum num-
ber of modified entries. This makes their construction extremely static
and not suitable for our application. Micali et al. mention this in their
open problems section.
Speed because Micali et al.’s scheme must satisfy additional constraints, it is
much slower (five modular exponentations per node versus one application
of an optimized hash function).
7 Summary
We have presented an efficient mechanism that allows readers to verify the
replies of a database with the help of the writers. To achieve this, we introduced
a new cryptographic primitive, an extension of Merkle’s hash trees. A verifica-
tion protocol between reader and database validates a reply with a low amount
of data traffic. This extends even to those replies where the database denies
the existence of the requested entry. The mechanism thus allows a database to
prove that it does not know about such an entry. We examined the relationship
to work in the area of certificate management, and showed how our proposal
can be applied there as well. In comparison to the more general Zero–knowledge
sets by Micali et al., our scheme has the advantage that it is faster and allows
subsequent modifications by multiple writers.
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Listing 8: insert(): Insertion of a new entry
struct node * insert(bitstring path , char value [160] , struct node * node) {
if ( node == NULL ){
/* virgin sub -tree: create new leaf */
init ( List);
init ( newnode);
init ( entry);
newnode ->flag = LEAF;
List = leafnode(path , value);
entry ->path = path;
entry ->value = value;
newnode ->e = entry;
newnode ->hash = h(List [0][0] . List [0][1]);
free(List);
return( newnode);
}
if(node ->flag == BRANCH){
init ( newnode);
bit = shift path;
/* walk down */
newnode = insert(path , value , node ->b[bit ]);
/* update the hash value on the way back */
init ( pair);
pair[bit ] = newnode -> hash;
if (node ->b[not bit ] == NULL) {
pair[not bit ] = Empty[length(path)];
} else {
pair[not bit ] = node ->b[not bit]-> hash;
}
node ->hash = h(pair[0] . pair[1]);
return(node);
}
if(node ->flag == LEAF){
/* change LEAF to BRANCH */
init ( tmppath);
init ( tmpval);
tmppath = node ->e->path;
tmpval = node ->e->value;
node ->flag = BRANCH;
/* move leaf’s content down along its own path */
free node ->entry;
node ->entry = NULL;
node = insert(tmppath , tmpval , node);
/* insert new ( path , value) in the now BRANCH */
bit = shift path;
init ( newnode);
newnode = insert(path , value , node ->b[bit ]);
/* update hash on the way back */
node ->b[bit ] = newnode;
init ( pair);
pair[bit ] = newnode -> hash;
if (node ->b[not bit ] == NULL) {
pair[not bit ] = Empty[length(path)];
} else {
pair[not bit ] = node ->b[not bit]-> hash;
}
node ->hash = h(pair[0] . pair[1]);
return(node);
}
}
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Listing 9: delete(): Deleting the entry at the end of a given path
struct node * delete(bitstring path , struct node * node){
if(node ->flag == LEAF) {
/* remove LEAF , stop recursion */
free (node -> entry);
free ( node);
return NULL;
}
/* we’re on the way to the leaf still */
init ( pair);
/* remember the bit */
bit = shift path;
/* walk down */
node ->b[bit ] = delete(path , node ->b[bit ]);
/* reconstruct the path */
path = prepend bit , path;
/* how many non -children ?*/
for (i = 0 , 1) {
if(node ->b[i] == NULL) {
emp = i;
numemp++;
}
}
if(numemp == 2){
/* node was a stalk with a single leaf , delete */
free ( node);
return NULL;
}
if(numemp == 1){
if(node ->b[not emp]-> flag == LEAF){
/* one child , a leaf , move it up */
node ->e = node ->b[not emp]->e;
node ->e->path = node ->e->path;
/* correct the path */
pop node ->e->path;
node -> flag = LEAF;
pair[emp ] = Empty[length(path)];
pair[not emp ] = node ->b[not emp]-> hash;
node -> hash = h(pair[0] . pair[1]);
free (node ->b[not emp]->e);
free (node ->b[not emp ]);
return node;
} else {
/* branch node leading to at least two leafs */
/* update the hash */
pair[emp ] = Empty[length(path)];
pair[not emp ] = node ->b[not emp]-> hash;
node -> hash = h(pair[0] . pair[1]);
return node;
}
}
if(numemp == 0){
/* branch node with at least two leafs below */
/* update the hash */
pair[0] = node ->b[0]->hash;
pair[1] = node ->b[1]->hash;
node ->hash = h(pair[0] . pair[1]);
return node;
}
}
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